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WINE NOT? PUTTING A CORK IN
THE SEMI-GENERIC CATEGORY OF WINE
Toujours le vin sent son terroir.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagining a marketplace in Bordeaux, France, circa 1800, helps
paint a picture of what some argue to be the origin of trademark law.
The residents of Bordeaux would have almost exclusively consumed
Bordeaux wine; not because of preference, but because that was all
their region produced. Over time, the globalization of trade would al-
low vendors to present the Bordeaux market with goods from across
the world—the residents would be given an opportunity to experience
goods like Riesling wines from Germany or Parmesan Reggiano from
Italy. Consumers started to associate the quality of the good with the
region from where it came. These associations and reputations began
to develop in a manner similar to product branding and trademarks.2
Eventually, European countries enacted laws prohibiting manufac-
turers from using certain titles unless the good was actually produced
in its respective region.3 This legally protected designation of origins
became known as a “Geographical Indication.”4 These laws are in-
tended to protect consumers by guaranteeing that the product they
are purchasing has the qualities associated with the geographical indi-
cation.5 They are also intended to protect the manufacturer by ensur-
ing that free-riders do not profit from marketing a product that
exploits a certain geographical indication.6 A geographical indication’s
1. “Wine always smells of its terroir.”
2. Justin Hughes, Champagne, Feta, and Bourbon: The Spirited Debate About Geographical
Indications, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 299, 300–01 (2006) (noting how some contend that trademarks
developed in a similar fashion to geographical indications) (citing CHRISTIAN BOUDAN, GE´O-
POLITIQUE DU GOUˆT, LA GUERRE CULINAIRE 39–42, 46–51 (2004); M.G. Coerper, The Protec-
tion of Geographical Indications in the United States of America, 29 INDUS. PROP. 232 (1990)).
3. Hughes, supra note 2, at 301; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (governing the allowance of R
geographical designations as collective or certification marks); Agreement on Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 22, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197
[hereinafter TRIPS].
4. Hughes, supra note 2, at 301. R
5. Id.
6. Id. at 300.
753
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downfall is known as “genericization,” or the erasure of a term’s sig-
nificance because of its adoption as common vocabulary.7
The idea of intellectual property within the United States, however,
developed differently.8 The American consumer often views the qual-
ity of a good to be linked to the product or the “doing,” rather than
the “auteur” or its status.9 Various regional designations are recog-
nized within the United States as a form of intellectual property since
the United States has primarily categorized geographical indications
as falling within trademark law.10 Yet this difference in attitude is
often a source of contention between European and American agree-
ments concerning intellectual property rights.11
As the legal field develops, various commentators have asked
whether it is possible to slowly begin bridging this gap.12 This Com-
ment will explore the disparities between trademark law and the
United States’ protection of geographical indications that pertain to
wine. Specifically, this Comment will advocate for the removal of the
“semi-generic” categorization of wine, contending that the category
comports with neither domestic trademark law nor an international
treaty governing the use of geographical indications. Part II begins
with a discussion of the protection of geographical indications in the
European Union, how the United States’ trademark regime functions,
and how geographical indications are protected domestically. Part II
then discusses the United States’ regulation of wine and regional des-
7. Id.; see also Cmty. of Roquefort v. William Faehndrich, Inc., 303 F.2d 494, 497 (2d Cir.
1962) (stating a geographical indication will warrant legal protection only if it continues “to
indicate the regional origin, mode of manufacture, etc. of the goods upon which it is used”). But
if the term becomes used primarily to describe the identity of the good rather than the nexus
tying origin and quality, then the term has become generic and does not warrant protection. Id.
8. Eva Gutierrez, Geographical Indicators: A Unique European Perspective on Intellectual
Property, 29 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 29, 41 (2005).
9. Hughes, supra note 2, at 335 (discussing the concept of continental intellectual property as R
an entitlement of rights that stem from the auteur—the individual producing or crafting the
work—and how most intellectual property rights in the United States are based on merit and act
as an incentive to create, rather than as an incentive to preserve tradition, history, and status as
used in Europe). Some scholars even note that the European approach is antithetical to “the
American capitalist view of society.” See Gutierrez, supra note 8, at 41. R
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
11. Margaret Ritzert, Champagne Is from Champagne: An Economic Justification for Ex-
tending Trademark-Level Protection to Wine-Related Geographical Indicators, 37 AIPLA Q.J.
191, 202–03 (2009).
12. See Hughes, supra note 2, at 314–15; Frances G. Zacher, Pass the Parmesan: Geographic R
Indications in the United States and the European Union—Can There Be Compromise?, 19 EM-
ORY INT’L L. REV 427, 427–30 (2005); Lindsey A. Zahn, Australia Corked Its Champagne and So
Should We: Enforcing Stricter Protection for Semi-Generic Wines in the United States, 21 TRANS-
NAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 477, 487 (2012); Laura Zanzig, The Perfect Pairing: Protecting U.S.
Geographical Indications with a Sino-American Wine Registry, 88 WASH. L. REV. 723, 734–35
(2013).
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ignations. Part III examines whether the current regulatory scheme
governing wine designations comports with either trademark law or
the European Union’s geographical indication laws. Part III will con-
tinue to look at how the amendment of the regulations may bring it
closer in line with both fields of law. Finally, Part IV will look at the
possible impact of this approach within the United States and its po-
tential to shift our cultural and economic views. Part V concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
Unbeknownst to many of us, our average trip to the grocery store is
heavily impacted by the regulation of these geographical indications
(GIs). Not to be confused with geographic identifiers (e.g., a “Made in
China” tag), geographical indications are protected titles placed on
products to designate their place of origin and associated qualities.13
The difference between the two terms, and the crux of GIs, is a nexus
between the origin of the good and its associated quality.14 For exam-
ple, only sparkling wine made in the Champagne region of France is
(generally) called “Champagne,” and only whiskeys made in Scotland
can be named “Scotch.”15 By contrast, although a geographical identi-
fier may inform the consumer that a table is made in China, it does
not indicate that any furniture quality is reputed to Chinese produc-
tion.16 The regulation of a GI like “Champagne” exists to denote the
reputation of the geographical region’s soil and weather conditions,
and its relationship to certain flavors and attributes particular to those
conditions.17
This Section will first introduce how GIs are protected abroad and
its implications to the law of the United States. Then, it will discuss
how GIs are protected within the United States, starting with an over-
view of trademark protection, and followed by how GIs are incorpo-
rated into trademark law. This Section then discusses how wines are
regulated within the United States, before concluding with a discus-
sion about the disparities between wine regulations and trademark
law.
13. Hughes, supra note 2, at 305. R
14. Id. at 304–05. “This is the idea of terroir: that the particular geography produces particular
product characteristics that cannot be imitated by other regions,” and that reflected within GI
laws is a “known land/qualities nexus.” Id. (emphasis in original).
15. Id.; see also 27 C.F.R. § 5.22 (2018) (governing the titles of spirits).
16. Hughes, supra note 2, at 305. R
17. Id. at 307 (“French law defines an AOC as a region or locality name ‘that serves to desig-
nate a product of that origin whose qualities or characteristics are due to the geographic milieu,
which includes natural and human elements.’”).
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A. Geographical Indication and the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights Agreement
Before diving into the nuance of how GIs are protected in the
United States, it is beneficial to first understand how international law
has influenced our regimes. First, the United States is a signatory to
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS).18 The TRIPS Agreement regulates the use of, among
other things, GIs.19 Under the TRIPS Agreement, geographical indi-
cations are goods that come from a geographical region and are also
attributed with producing a specific characteristic in the good itself.20
This agreement covers both foreign and local designations alike.21
Some examples include Florida oranges22 and Champagne.
The TRIPS Agreement stemmed from a series of inconsistent inter-
national agreements that the United States sought to make uniform.23
The main objective of the TRIPS Agreement is to preserve the cul-
ture, history, and tradition behind the regional designations by limit-
ing the genericization of geographic indications.24 Some
commentators, however, discuss the view that the European Union
saw the agreement as an opportunity to globalize its standards of GI
protection.25
The TRIPS Agreement protects GIs through three provisions: Arti-
cles 22, 23, and 24. Article 22 provides a starting point and base-level
protections by requiring member countries to protect marks that fit
the definition of a geographical indication.26 Article 23 requires signa-
tories to provide stronger protections to GIs relating to wines and
spirits.27 Article 24 provides an exception instructing countries to
18. TRIPS, supra note 3, at art. 12. R
19. Id. at arts. 22–24.
20. Hughes, supra note 2, at 314. “Geographical indications are, for purposes of this Agree- R
ment, indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a Member, or a region
or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good
is essentially attributable to its geographical origin.” Id. (quoting TRIPS, supra note 3, at art. 22 R
¶ 1). This provision of the agreement establishes a “floor” for geographical indications. “This
definition is not limited to words, so images and packaging are potentially included.” Id.
21. Peter M. Brody, Geographical Indications and Dilution: Reinterpreting “Distinctiveness”
Under the Lanham Act, 100 TRADEMARK REP. 905, 906–07 (2010).
22. Id. at 907.
23. Hughes, supra note 2, at 311–14. R
24. Zahn, supra note 12, at 487. R
25. Sarah A. Hinchliffe, Trademarks, GIs, and Commercial Aspects of Wine Distribution
Agreements, 10 J. FOOD. L. & POL’Y 107, 116 (2014).
26. TRIPS, supra note 3, at art. 22; see also Hughes, supra note 2, at 314–16. R
27. TRIPS, supra note 3, at art. 23; see also Zanzig, supra note 12, at 733–34. R
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grant GIs in certain situations where they would otherwise be
invalid.28
Article 22 defines a geographic indication as a mark which “iden-
tif[ies] a good as originating in the territory of a Member, or a region
or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation, or other
characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical
origin.”29 Although this does not appear to include services,30 the defi-
nition is not limited to words. Accordingly, images and packaging that
induce consumers to believe that the product comes from a certain
region and bears a certain quality or reputation are implicated.31 Arti-
cle 22 requires countries to protect marks that fit this definition by
providing legal rights to action for marks that mislead the public by
“indicat[ing] or suggest[ing]” that it comes from a geographic region
when it in fact does not.32
Article 23 grants additional protection to wines and spirits. It directs
Members to deny protection and registration to marks embodying an
inaccurate geographical indication for wines or spirits.33 Furthermore,
the provision requires member countries to remove the goods from
commerce.34 So long as the good does not come from the region in
dispute, the manufacturer cannot use “expressions such as ‘kind,’
‘type,’ ‘style,’ ‘imitation,’ or the like,” nor can the manufacturer in-
clude a disclaimer identifying the true origin to escape liability.35 This
standard eliminates many labeling and advertising possibilities in an
attempt to eliminate confusion even though it would increase con-
sumer information.36
Article 24 provides limitations and exceptions.37 Greatly disliked by
the European Union, the article contains a claw-back provision and a
grandfather provision.38 The claw-back provision allows countries to
reject protection for terms that are generic even though they may or-
dinarily warrant protection.39 Boiled down, the grandfather clause
28. TRIPS, supra note 3, at art. 24 (insisting countries be open to being lenient in granting GI R
protection, particularly where the mark had been in use for 10 years or applied for in good faith);
see also Zanzig, supra note 12, at 735. R
29. TRIPS, supra note 3, at art. 22(1). R
30. Hughes, supra note 2, at 314–15. R
31. TRIPS, supra note 3, at art. 22(1); see also Hughes, supra note 2, at 314–15. R
32. TRIPS, supra note 3, at art. 22(2). R
33. Id. at art. 23(2).
34. Id.
35. Id. at art. 23 ¶ 1.
36. Hughes, supra note 2, at 318. R
37. TRIPS, supra note 3, at art. 24. R
38. Id.
39. Id.
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removes the requirement for member countries to invalidate marks if
the right to the mark in question developed before that country joined
the TRIPS Agreement or before the GI received protection in its
country of origin.40 Finally, generic terms are not protected by the
other obligations found within the TRIPS Agreement.41
B. Protection of Trademarks in the United States
In the United States, trademark law protects any word, name, sym-
bol, or device that identifies and distinguishes a good or service in
commerce.42 Additionally, GIs fall within the domain of trademark
law in the United States.43 This subsection will first look at distinctive-
ness—the baseline requirement that must be established before a
mark can be protected under trademark law. Then, it will consider the
reasons for the distinctiveness requirement before moving on to how
GIs are protected in the United States.
1. Distinctiveness
Under the Lanham Act, courts require a mark to be distinctive
before it can be protected by trademark law.44 In Abercrombie &
Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., the Second Circuit created a frame-
work known as the Abercrombie spectrum, and it is widely used today
to analyze distinctiveness.45 The framework proposes that the distinc-
tiveness of a mark can be divided into five categories: fanciful, arbi-
trary, suggestive, descriptive, and generic marks.46 The word
“fanciful” describes marks that were never words until they came to
be used to identify a good or service.47 Arbitrary marks are common
words that have meaning but are used in an arbitrary manner when
40. Id. at art. 24 ¶¶ 5(a)–(b); Hughes, supra note 2, at 319. R
41. TRIPS, supra note 3, at art. 24(6) (“Nothing in this Section shall require a Member to R
apply its provisions in respect of a geographical indication of any other Member with respect to
goods or services for which the relevant indication is identical with the term customary in com-
mon language as the common name for such goods or services in the territory of that
Member.”).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
43. See discussion infra Part II.C (reviewing the treatment of GIs in the United States).
44. Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983), abrogated by
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004).
45. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9–11 (2d. Cir. 1976); see also
Joseph Scott Miller, Abercrombie 2.0—Can We Get There from Here? Thoughts on “Suggestive
Fair Use”, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE 1, 2 (2016) (discussing how the case, as of 2016, had
been cited by over 850 cases and over 580 law review articles).
46. Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 790. It should be noted that this court grouped fanciful and arbitrary
together as one category.
47. Id. at 791 (noting that KODAK is a fanciful mark).
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used to identify a good.48 Suggestive marks are words that suggest or
imply a characteristic of the good or service, but require some leap of
the imagination for the consumer to understand the relation between
the mark and the good.49 Descriptive marks consist of terms that iden-
tify a good’s characteristic and call for no imagination to understand
the relation between the mark and the good.50 Finally, generic marks
identify a product’s genus or class.51
In addition to the Abercrombie spectrum, courts differentiate be-
tween marks that are “inherently distinctive” and marks that are in-
herently weak and demand “acquired distinctiveness.”52 Marks that
are inherently weak consequently require a showing that the market
has come to perceive the mark as identifying “not the product but the
producer.”53 This required showing is also known as “[p]roof of secon-
dary meaning.”54 Thus, marks that are inherently distinctive are pro-
tectable on their own, and marks that are inherently weak require a
showing of acquired distinctiveness or secondary meaning. Within the
Abercrombie spectrum, fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive marks do
not require a showing of secondary meaning while distinctive marks
do.55 And as for generic marks, they may never be protected under
trademark law.56
2. The Purpose of the Distinctiveness Requirement
The requirement that a mark be distinctive before it can be pro-
tected draws from trademark law’s aversion to allowing people to mo-
nopolize general terms, which creates high barriers to enter the
market.57 This concern is most salient when looking at how the place-
ment of a mark on the Abercrombie spectrum also corresponds to a
mark’s inherent distinctiveness. For example, generic marks are inher-
48. Id. (providing the example of IVORY as arbitrary when used to identify soap). But be-
cause IVORY contains a slight relation to the usual color of soap, a better example may be
APPLE computers.
49. Id. (noting how COPPERTONE was deemed to be a suggestive mark when identifying
tanning products).
50. Id. at 790 (stating that VISION CENTER is a descriptive mark when it identifies a busi-
ness that provides optical goods or services).
51. Id. (“Such terms as . . . cellophane have been held generic.”).
52. Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 791; see also 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADE-
MARKS AND COMPETITION § 14:5 (5th ed. 2019).
53. Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938).
54. Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 791. “[S]econdary meaning recognizes that words with an ordinary
and primary meaning of their own ‘may by long use with a particular product, come to be known
by the public as specifically designating that product.’” Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 790.
57. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 12:2. R
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ently weak and can never be protected because trademark law seeks
to promote competition in the market.58 Allowing the producer of a
good or service to have a protected interest in using a generic term
would create a great barrier to entry because trademark law would
prevent competitors from using generic terms when describing their
own product.59 For example, if a producer of apples receives a protect-
able interest in the word “Apple,” then trademark law would serve as
a barrier to entry because it would allow the producer to restrict other
apple producers from using the term to describe their goods.60
Courts follow the same line of thinking when addressing descriptive
marks. In Security Center, Ltd. v. First National Security Centers, the
Fifth Circuit held that when “security center” was used to describe a
business that provided vault and security-storage services, the mark
was descriptive.61 In doing so, the court considered competitors’ need
for the words “security” and “center” to describe their own business.62
Moreover, the court did not analyze the mark in a vacuum because
courts decide whether a mark is descriptive by considering the mark in
the context of how the goods and services are provided.63 Courts
make these considerations when deciding whether a mark is descrip-
tive in order to assure that a grant of protection does not create an
unreasonable barrier to entry.64 If the court had decided that the mark
was more distinctive than a descriptive mark, the decision would have
impacted the market by prohibiting others from using “security
center” in describing services related to security storage. The court
58. Id. (citing CES Pub. Corp. v. St. Regis Publ’ns, Inc., 531 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1975)) (dis-
cussing Judge Friendly’s comment that granting protection to a generic term would prevent com-
petitors from describing their goods, and consequently be equivalent to allowing the mark
holder to monopolize a portion of the market).
59. Id. In Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., Judge Posner asked the reader to
“[i]magine being forbidden to describe a Chevrolet as a ‘car’ or an ‘automobile’ because Ford or
Chrysler or Volvo had trademarked these generic words.” 781 F.2d 604, 609 (7th Cir. 1986).
60. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 12:1. By contrast, using the word “Apple” to describe R
computers is less concerning because the arbitrary connection between the word and the good
means that competitors have less need for the word “apple” to describe their good.
61. 750 F.2d 1295, 1299–1300 (5th Cir. 1985).
62. Id. at 1300 (“We look into [competitors’] actual and likely use of a mark in order to deter-
mine whether its protection, i.e., its exclusion from the language freely available for commercial
use, interferes with competition among providers of the same product or service.”).
63. Id. at 1299 (“A plausible interpretation of the phrase—not in vacuo, but in its natural
setting—would be ‘a center where security is afforded one’s property.’ To arrive at this defini-
tion, one must jettison all patently extraneous definitions of either ‘security’ or ‘center.’”).
64. Id. at 1300 (“The more users there are of a term, the more its protection in a given case
would be commercially disruptive and unfair to competitors.”).
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opined on how this alternative outcome would conflict with general
policies that promote free markets and competitor entry.65
By contrast, inherently distinctive marks pose less concern about
market entry.66 This is especially clear when considering marks that
constitute fanciful marks on the Abercrombie spectrum. There are
fewer barriers to entry when the law grants protection to a fanciful
mark.67 This is because the word never contained any lexical signifi-
cance prior to its creation and consequently does not limit the number
of ways that a competitor can describe his or her goods.68 And the
number of ways to create a fanciful mark are limitless, thus giving
competitors an endless number of alternatives that they could use to
identify their goods.69
C. Geographic Indications in the United States
But there stand three bars to registration relevant to GIs. These are
the bars against primarily geographically descriptive marks, geograph-
ically deceptive marks, and geographically deceptively misdescriptive
marks.70 Mostly, the only class registerable under the Lanham Act are
marks that are primarily geographically descriptive.71 And a mark that
is primarily geographically descriptive may only be registered if it has
acquired secondary meaning,72 if it does not draw in the mind of con-
sumers a connection to the claimed location of origin,73 or to the ex-
tent it constitutes a GI that satisfies the conditions for collective or
certification marks.74 Perhaps most interestingly, a geographic mark
that is registered as a collective or certification mark need not prove
65. Id. (“[I]t would disserve the public to sanction use of the term [security center] by only
one business in a given region, when other words can readily be affixed to the term for purposes
of differentiation and clarity as to source.”).
66. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 TRADE-
MARK REP. 267, 275–76 (1988).
67. Id. at 288. (“The so-called fanciful mark—the made-up name that resembles no other
word, such as EXXON or KODAK—is the economically (and legally) least problematic.”).
68. Id. (“These costs are modest, at least in the simple case of the ‘fanciful’ mark, such as
EXXON and KODAK, which has no information content except to denote a specific producer
or brand.”).
69. Id. (“The distinctive yet pronounceable combinations of letters to form words that will
serve as [fanciful marks] are as a practical matter infinite, implying a high degree of sub-
stitutability and hence a slight value in exchange.”).
70. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 14:26. R
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2012).
72. Id. (citing Del. & Hudson Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 317 (1871)).
73. Id. (citing In re The Newbridge Cutlery Co., 776 F.3d 854 (2015)).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 establishes that a mark may be refused registration if it “[c]onsists of a
mark which . . . when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily
geographically descriptive of them, except as indications of regional origin may be registrable
under section 1054 of this title.”
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\68-4\DPL403.txt unknown Seq: 10 12-JUN-19 8:50
762 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:753
that it has acquired distinctiveness or provide proof of secondary
meaning.75
In the United States, geographical indications are generally regis-
tered as a collective or certification mark, and are maintained by a
single, quasi-governmental agency.76 The Lanham Act defines collec-
tive marks as marks that are used by members of a group to indicate
that a service or good is provided by a member of the group.77 Collec-
tive marks essentially function as affirmations that the provider of the
good is a member of the group or union, but the organization itself
may not use the mark on its own goods.78 Similarly, a certification
mark is owned by a single entity, but the entity does not itself use the
mark.79 Instead, the owning entity grants other producers the right to
use the mark, and the mark certifies that the good or service met the
approval standards of quality or origin of the owning entity.80 Certifi-
cation marks essentially function as one entity’s stamp of approval,
while collective marks function to show that the user of the mark is a
member of an organization.
A geographic mark that is registered as a certification mark need
not prove secondary meaning.81 Prior to the United States becoming a
TRIPS signatory, the Second Circuit in Community of Roquefort v.
William Faehndrich, Inc. recognized that a geographical mark need
not have secondary meaning in order to be registered as a valid certifi-
cation mark.82 This rule continued after the United States joined
TRIPS as a signatory.83 The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
(TTAB), in Tea Board of India v. The Republic of Tea, Inc., noted
that although geographically descriptive marks are only entitled to
weak protection, “the presumption that a geographic term is inher-
75. Cmty. of Roquefort v. William Faehndrich, Inc., 303 F.2d 494, 497 (2d Cir. 1962).
76. Emily Nation, Geographical Indications: The International Debate over Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights for Local Producers, 82 U. CO. L. REV 959, 975–78 (2011).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
78. Nat’l Trailways Bus Sys. v. Trailway Van Lines, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 352, 356 (1965) (“A
collective mark indicates membership in a group. If the association which owns the mark pro-
duces goods, it may not be affixed to the goods.”).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
80. Id.
81. Cmty. of Roquefort v. William Faehndrich, Inc., 303 F.2d 494, 497 (2d Cir. 1962).
82. Id. “But section 1052[(e)], which prohibits registration of names primarily geographically
descriptive, specifically excepts ‘indications of regional origin’ registrable under section 1054.
Therefore, a geographical name may be registered as a certification mark even though it is pri-
marily geographically descriptive.” Id.
83. .  See Brody, supra note 21, at 906 (discussing the enactment of TRIPS and the United R
States’s involvement as a signatory); see also Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea, Inc., 80
U.S.P.Q.2d 1881 (T.T.A.B. 2006) (recognizing that certain GIs need not have secondary mean-
ing years after the enactment of TRIPS).
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ently weak does not attach to geographic terms that are used to certify
regional origin.”84 The TTAB concluded that a DARJEELING certi-
fication mark was inherently distinctive, and was consequently pro-
tectable without having to establish acquired distinctiveness.85 As
such, geographic marks can be registered as certification marks with-
out having to show acquired distinctiveness or secondary meaning.
Regional designations will not be protected, however, if the term
has become “generic.”86 Equally as prevalent as ROQUEFORT
cheese is parmesan cheese, but parmesan cheese need not come from
the Parma region of Italy though Roquefort cheese may only come
from Roquefort, France.87 This is a result of what is known as “gener-
icization;” situations where the third-party use of the geographical
term to describe the product became so extensive that it eliminated
the meaning of the word.88 Once an indication or mark becomes “ge-
neric,” it has no potential for protection.89 This is because regional
designations can only constitute a certification or collective mark if
they “continue to indicate the regional origin, mode of manufacture,
etc. of the goods” using the mark, rather than the good’s genus or
class.90
D. Protection of Wines
Geographical indications relating to wine and spirits may also be
protected under the field of trademark law.91 The TTAB presided
over a challenge to the use of CANADIAN MIST AND COGNAC to
identify a drink of Canadian whiskey mixed with cognac.92 Relevant
84. Brody, supra note 21, at 920–21 (quoting Tea Bd., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1881). R
85. Tea Bd., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1901 (“Geographically descriptive terms are generally regarded
as inherently weak and entitled to less protection than arbitrary or suggestive marks . . . . [W]e
consider DARJEELING inherently distinctive as a certification mark indicating geographic ori-
gin as it inherently identifies the geographic source of the tea.”).
86. Hughes, supra note 2, at 303–04; see also Cmty. of Roquefort v. William Faehndrich, Inc., R
303 F.2d 494, 497 (2d Cir. 1962) (stating geographical indications will warrant legal protection
only if it continues “to indicate the regional origin, mode of manufacture, etc. of the goods upon
which it is used,” and if the term becomes used primarily to describe the identity of the good
rather than the origin/quality nexus, then the term has become generic and does not warrant
protection).
87. Compare Cmty. of Roquefort, 303 F.2d at 497–98, with Hughes, supra note 2, at 329. Inter- R
estingly enough, PARMIGGIANO REGGIANO is protectable in the United States as a certifi-
cation mark, but “parmesan” is not protectable even though it is a mere translation. See Hughes,
supra note 2, at 329; Nation, supra note 76, at 963–64. R
88. Hughes, supra note 2, at 300. R
89. Roquefort, 303 F.2d at 497.
90. Id.
91. Institut National des Appelations d’Origine v. Brown-Forman Corp., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1875
(T.T.A.B. 1998).
92. Id. at 1875.
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here is how the TTAB, in reconciling the use of COGNAC with the
language of the Lanham Act, held that the mark received protection
as a valid common law regional certification mark.93 In addition to
this case of cognac, a cursory search of registered certification marks
yields thousands of results for marks that would be protected under
the Lanham Act, and a large number of these marks identify an alco-
holic good’s regional origin.94
Aside from trademark law, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Fire-
arms and Explosives (ATF) created a separate regime regulating des-
ignations for geographical indications relating to domestic wine.95
These are called American Viticultural Areas (AVAs).96 Use of geo-
graphical indications of wines and spirits are regulated by the Code of
Federal Regulations (C.F.R.).97 Now, the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax
and Trade Bureau (TTB) regulates the provisions governing geo-
graphical indications of wines and spirits.98 Under the C.F.R., wines
are divided into three classes: those that are generic,99 those that are
semi-generic,100 and those that are non-generic.101 Spirits have specific
classifications depending on the designation and are defined
individually.102
Wines that are “generic” are those that have been designated by the
Administrator to no longer designate a singular wine distinct from
93. Id. at 1885.
94. M. Coerper, Certification Marks as a Means of Protecting Wine Appellations in the United
States, 16 ABA IPL NEWSL. 24, 24 (1998).
95. Michael Maher, On Vino Veritas? Clarifying the Use of Geographic References on Ameri-
can Wine Labels, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1881, 1892 (2001).
96. 27 C.F.R. § 9.1 (2018).
97. Id. §§ 4.20, 5.22.
98. D. Peter Harvey, Geographical Indications: The United States’ Perspective, 107 TRADE-
MARK REP. 960, 962 (2017). It is important to note that the C.F.R. regulations are rights distinct
from trademark law. See generally infra Part II.E.
99. “A name of geographic significance which is also the designation of a class or type of wine,
shall be deemed to have become generic only if so found by the Administrator.” 27 C.F.R.
§ 4.24(a)(1) (2018). Some examples include Vermouth and Sake. Id. § 4.24(a)(2).
100. Like generic indications, the Administrator decides which terms are semi-generic. Id.
§ 4.24(b)(1). Standards of protecting these designations are stricter than generic wines. If the
wine does not come from the indicated region, the designation may still be used if in conjunction
with a disclosure of the true place of origin. Id. Examples include Burgundy, Champagne, and
Sherry. Id. § 4.24(b)(2).
101. If a wine has not been found by the Administrator to be either generic or semi-generic,
then the wine is non-generic. Id. § 4.24(c)(1). The Administrator must take into account whether
it is known to consumers that the designation is of a specific wine originating from a specific
region, and that it is distinguishable from all other wines. Id. § 4.24(b)(1). This class receives the
strongest protection; they may only be used for wines originating from the region indicated by
the designation. Id.
102. Id. § 5.22(k)(1).
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others of its variety.103 The C.F.R. lists two examples: Vermouth and
Sake.104 Due to the vast extent of the third-party use of generic terms,
wines like Vermouth and Sake now represent a type of wine, rather
than geographic regions and their associated qualities in producing
wine.105 Commensurate to its lack of distinctiveness, manufacturers of
wines are allowed to use generic designations like “Vermouth” and
“Sake” despite the wine’s origin or composition.106
The Administrator may also coin wine types as “semi-generic” if the
wines have a third-party connotation that weakens the nexus between
the designation and its respective region.107 These are granted
stronger protection than generic wines. If a wine uses a semi-generic
designation though it does not originate from the indicated region,
then it may only be used with the product if it (1) contains a dis-
claimer stating its true origin and (2) still conforms to the identity of
the referenced wine.108 Some examples include Burgundy, Cham-
pagne, and Sherry.109
Finally, wines that are neither generic nor semi-generic may qualify
to be non-generic. These are designations that the Administrator has
found to be known by consumers as indicative of wines originating
from a particular region, and distinguishable from all other wines.110
This class is further subdivided into designations that are not distinc-
tive of specific grape wines,111 and designations that are distinctive of
specific grape wines.112 These designations are prohibited from use
unless they meet the grape composition requirements listed in the
statute.113
E. A Clash of Federal Laws
It is necessary to note that trademark laws governing a regional cer-
tification mark under the Lanham Act entail different rights from
103. Id. § 4.24(a)(1).
104. Id. § 4.24(a)(2).
105. 27 C.F.R. § 4.24(a)(2).
106. See id. (omitting any regulation governing the use of generic wines, while the provisions
governing semi-generic and non-generic wines contain restrictions on their use).
107. Id. § 4.24(b)(1).
108. Id.
109. Id. § 4.24(b)(2).
110. Id. § 4.24(c)(1).
111. For example, “American” and “French” wine are not distinctive of specific grape wines.
27 C.F.R. § 4.24(c)(2).
112. For example, “Bordeaux Rouge” and “Medoc” are distinctive of specific grape wines. Id.
§ 4.24(c)(3).
113. Id. § 4.24(c).
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those governed by the wine-related regulations under the C.F.R.114
Little caselaw exists to clarify the relationship between the two, and
what courts have said is that viticultural regulations and trademark
laws are simultaneously discrete and interrelated.115
First, in Sociedad Anonima Vin˜a Santa Rita v. U.S. Department of
Treasury, a district court held that the owner of a registered mark for
SANTA RITA, in identifying a class of wine from Chile, could not
enjoin the Treasury from creating a viticultural designation for Cali-
fornian wines coming from “Santa Rita Hills.”116 The court ultimately
decided that the creation of the viticultural designation did not over-
step plaintiff’s trademark rights and that plaintiff would be able to
bring trademark infringement claims against individual wineries that
violated plaintiff’s trademark rights.117
Yet in Leelanau Wine Cellars, Ltd. v. Black & Red, Inc., the Sixth
Circuit addressed the relationship between enforcing trademark in-
fringement and the designation of a region as a protected AVA.118 In
Leelanau, a plaintiff began using the LEELANAU CELLARS mark
prior to its designation as an AVA.119 After the Treasury declared the
peninsula to be an AVA, defendant began using the mark CHATEAU
DE LEELANAU to identify its wine that came from Leelanau.120 Af-
ter attempting to bring a trademark infringement claim, the court
noted that the Leelanau designation as an AVA was the kind of public
information that would decrease a consumer’s likelihood of confusing
the two marks.121
III. ANALYSIS
The United States can change its regulations governing wine in a
manner that would serve the interests of the European Union while
still promoting the economic interests of the domestic economy. The
most impactful step it can take to bridge the gap would be to abolish
114. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 14:19.50. R
115. D. Peter Harvey, Geographical Indications: The United States’ Perspective, 107 TRADE-
MARK REP. 960, 976 (2017).
116. Sociedad Anonima Vin˜a Santa Rita v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 193 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C.
2001); see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 14:19.50; Harvey, supra note 115, at 976. R
117. Santa Rita, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 20.
118. 502 F.3d 504, 510 (6th Cir. 2007); see Harvey, supra note 115, at 975; 2 MCCARTHY, supra R
note 52, § 14:19.50. R
119. Leelanau, 502 F.3d at 510–11.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 516. Important to this case was a determination about whether the mark had ac-
quired secondary meaning. Id. Ultimately, the court noted that “that the federal designation of
the Leelanau Peninsula as an AVA substantially decreased the possibility that a potential con-
sumer would, upon seeing the mark, necessarily think of LWC’s product.” Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\68-4\DPL403.txt unknown Seq: 15 12-JUN-19 8:50
2019] WINE NOT? 767
the semi-generic classification and to reclassify the various wines listed
therein as either generic or non-generic.122 Doing so would help align
the differences between trademark law and the Treasury’s wine regu-
lations. Additionally, the removal of the semi-generic category would
change the regulations to be more in line with the provisions of the
TRIPS agreement.
A. Under Trademark Law
Removal of the semi-generic category is better in line with trade-
mark law because courts hold that a primarily geographically descrip-
tive mark, when used as a collective mark, is not inherently weak.123
The Treasury’s designation of wines and their origins can arguably be
seen as the Treasury owning certification marks in certain wine labels
and granting constructive licenses to those who meet the Treasury’s
standards.124 It functions in a manner similar to the umbrella organi-
zations that generally own collective marks for GIs.125 Before the
name of a geographic region can be used as an “identifier” or “mark”
for the manufacturer’s wine, this regulation creates a standard re-
quirement that must first be met.126 It makes the “mark” available to
those who meet the standard and it controls the use of the “mark.”127
The regulations on wine should be changed to reflect the strength of
these de facto collective marks by eliminating the semi-generic cate-
gory and creating a dichotomy between generic marks and non-ge-
neric marks. This is not to say that the generic category should be
removed—the regulations should still withhold protection from wines
that denote a class of good rather than a geographic origin so as not to
hinder competition.128 But if a wine does not fully constitute a generic
mark, it should be granted protections under the non-generic category
because of their strength as a de facto collective mark indicating re-
gional origin. Currently, because the regulations treat the wines in
part as inherently weak in that the regulations consider them generic
to some extent, the regulations are not in line with the established
122. The next step would be to classify the wines in the semi-generic category as either generic
or non-generic. This Comment does not attempt to decide which wines should fall into either of
the two categories.
123. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 14:26 (citing Tea Bd., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1881; Roquefort, 303 R
F.2d 494) (“A geographical name can be registered as a certification mark without the necessity
of proof of secondary meaning.”).
124. See supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text. R
125. See Nation, supra 76, at 972–73. R
126. See supra notes 99–113 and accompanying text. R
127. See supra notes 99–113 and accompanying text. R
128. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text. R
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inherent strength of collective marks designating geographic origin.
The implication that these geographic designations are partially ge-
neric seems incongruous to the cases treating those marks as not in-
herently weak,129 since generic marks have no inherent strength and
can never be protected.130 Changing the regulations so that the wines
are either generic or non-generic may better reflect trademark law’s
recognition of greater protection to those marks.
Moreover, distinctions between descriptive and suggestive (the next
two classifications on the spectrum of distinctiveness) are often argued
as being blurred.131 The argued false dichotomy is palpable when
looking at cases like Equine Technologies, Inc. v. Equitechnology, Inc.,
where the court had to determine the distinctiveness of the mark
EQUINE TECHNOLOGIES when used to describe horse hoof care
products.132 One could view it as descriptive because it explains the
product: horse hoof care products use technology developed for
equine.133 Yet the First Circuit decided that a consumer needed to
exercise some imagination to make the connection between hoof
products and the words “Equine Technologies,” affirming the lower
court’s rationale that the term was suggestive because it gave no spe-
cific indication that the equine technology at hand pertained to
hooves and hoof care.134 Again, courts require secondary meaning
before granting protection to descriptive marks, while suggestive
marks are protectable on their own.135 In light of the decisions that a
primarily geographically descriptive collective mark is descriptive but
not inherently weak, they seem to fall within the more distinctive side
of the descriptive-suggestive zone.136 The existence of the semi-ge-
neric category, however, arguably aggravates the confusion between
descriptive and suggestive by pulling the semi-generic designations
into a category that is lower on the distinctiveness spectrum than what
courts have previously ruled. Abolishing the semi-generic category,
129. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text. R
130. Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 791 (5th Cir. 1983).
131. See generally Jake Linford, The False Dichotomy Between Suggestive and Descriptive
Trademarks, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1367 (2015) (arguing that the use of the spectrum to analyze
strength and distinctiveness should be redrawn such that suggestive marks may only be granted
protection upon a showing of secondary meaning).
132. 68 F.3d 542, 543–44 (1st Cir. 1995).
133. Id. at 545 (“Defendant’s argument boils down to its contention that ‘[a] consumer (i.e.,
farrier or equine veterinarian) would naturally expect a company called EQUINE TECHNOL-
OGIES to make high-tech hoof pads for horses.’”).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 544 n.2 (discussing the spectrum of distinctiveness and when secondary meaning is
required).
136. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text. R
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and reclassifying those wines as either generic or non-generic, would
be more reflective of the courts’ decisions that such geographic indica-
tions are not inherently weak.
B. Under TRIPS
Removal of semi-generic wine would also be greater in line with
TRIPS. TRIPS requires that wines and spirits are afforded greater
protection, prohibiting the use of “like” or “in the manner of” as justi-
fications for using a regional designation to describe a wine that did
not actually come from that area.137 Yet the semi-generic category al-
lows for precisely that.138 Wine producers may make such disclosures
to justify the use of regional designation for wines that do not come
from that region.139 At first glance, this may seem to run afoul of Arti-
cle 23 in TRIPS. Commentators, however, have noted that the regula-
tions may be in compliance with TRIPS because of Article 24’s claw-
back provision.140 Article 24 provides that protection need not be
granted to those geographic indications that have become generic in
the member country, even if protection would otherwise be required
under TRIPS.141 So by calling certain wines semi-generic, the United
States appears to be using Article 24 to circumvent the stringency of
Article 23.142
The semi-generic category created a space that has allowed the
United States to have its wine and drink it too. It did not fully em-
brace Article 24 because it created the notion of “semi-generic,”
rather than rescinding GIs that died from genericide.143 Moreover, it
goes directly against Article 23 by allowing a disclaimer to justify the
designation of an origin from which the wine does not come. Natu-
rally, every story has two sides. On one hand, the United States could
be seen as exploiting a loophole within the system. On the other hand,
it could be argued that the United States is attempting to keep certain
denominations away from the fully generic category. But because
TRIPS says nothing on the existence of semi-generic GIs, it may be
137. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. R
138. See supra notes 107–109 and accompanying text. R
139. See supra notes 107–109 and accompanying text. R
140. See Ritzert, supra note 11, at 224; see also Leigh Ann Lindquist, champagne or Cham- R
pagne? An Examination of U.S. Failure to Comply with the Geographical Provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement, 27 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 309, 330–32 (1999).
141. See discussion supra notes 37–41. R
142. See Ritzert, supra note 11, at 224; see also Lindquist, supra note 140, at 330–32. R
143. See the definition of “genericization” in the text accompanying supra note 88.
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better in line with the language of TRIPS to remove the category and
decide on a stance when dealing with these GIs.144
By addressing the disparity in law between wine regulations and the
Lanham Act, the United States can kill two birds with one stone. In
removing the semi-generic category, each wine listed therein would
have to be categorized as either generic or non-generic. It would en-
courage alignment of trademark law with the wine regulations by ac-
knowledging the inherent strength of collective marks designating
geographic origin. Additionally, it would help bring our treatment of
wine-related marks into closer compliance with the language of
TRIPS.145
IV. IMPACT
The removal of the semi-generic category raises a series of impact
issues. First, any reclassification of wines from semi-generic to non-
generic goes to the heart of the United States’ concern about the ap-
propriation of the language. But past situations illustrating the suc-
cessful reclamation of generic terms should appease concerns about
granting protection to semi-generic terms. Second, abandoning the
semi-generic category will, no doubt, be costly. Acting sooner rather
than later to align wine regulations with both the Lanham Act and
TRIPS will, however, be worthwhile. Taking action now will also help
avoid costly litigation, lower our negotiation costs, and improve ten-
sions within international trade. Finally, other practical effects will in-
clude relieving certain wines of dilutive harms.
A. Linguistic Concerns, Historic Justifications
The United States has notoriously been resistant to strong GI pro-
tection, often citing two concerns. The first is the need to address a
disparity between the English language’s casual use of GIs and its
newly granted protection; the second is the cost of remarketing prod-
ucts to avoid using newly protected terms. Admittedly, it is an uphill
battle to argue that social and economic benefits outweigh the costs of
making semi-generic terms become non-generic. However, there are
reasons to appease those concerns and feel confident that wines mov-
ing from semi-generic to non-generic will not be as troublesome as
anticipated.
First, though rare, trademark law is not a stranger to companies re-
claiming their marks from the generic domain. “Singer” was once
144. See Ritzert, supra note 11, at 224. R
145. See generally TRIPS, supra note 3. R
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ruled a generic term for a sewing machine.146 “Goodyear” was
deemed a generic term for its rubber.147 After exhaustive advertising,
however, the two companies were able to recapture their marks from
the public domain.148 The court specifically noted in Singer that it was
due to the manufacturer’s “constant and exclusive use” of the mark
that helped change its primary significance.149 More recently, coun-
tries in the European Union needed to readjust their markets in order
to comply with TRIPS. Spanish producers of sparkling wine previ-
ously marketed their products as champagne, but had to find a new
term after they could no longer label it as such.150 Accordingly, the
wineries began to call the wine “Cava,” and the world moved on.151
Of the wines listed in the semi-generic category, the determination of
deeming which wines would be non-generic should be done by look-
ing at consumer perception and advertising efforts, as in the Singer
and Goodyear examples above. Moreover, looking at how the Spanish
Cava industry moved forward with ease, the entity tasked with reclas-
sifying the wines should not feel hesitant about the thought of catego-
rizing semi-generic wines.
B. Benefits of Proactive Action
Proactive action could potentially appease friction between the
United States and the European Union. The United States’ hesitation
to grant GIs strong protection has been an issue that caused a lot of
pressure.152 While countries were drafting the TRIPS Agreement,
“[n]egotiations regarding the protection of geographical indications
were among the most difficult. Unlike other issues in the Agreement
. . . it was the Europeans against North America . . . .”153
146. Jake Linford, A Linguistic Justification for Protecting “Generic” Trademarks, 17 YALE
J.L. & TECH. 110, 124 (2015) (citing Singer Mfg. Co. v. Briley, 207 F.2d 519, 520 n.3 (5th Cir.
1953); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. H. Rosenthal Co., 246 F. Supp. 724, 729 (D. Minn. 1965)).
147. Id.
148. See Ritzert, supra note 11, at 222. R
149. Singer, 207 F.2d at 520 n.3; see also Peter J. Brody, Comment, Reprotection for Formerly
Generic Trademarks, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 475, 482–83 (2015).
150. See Nation, supra note 76, at 999. R
151. Id.
152. See Zahn, supra note 12, at 482 n.35 (citing Philippe Zylberg, Geographical Indications v. R
Trademarks: The Lisbon Agreement: A Violation of TRIPS?, 11 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1,
30–39 (2002)).
153. Zylberg, supra note 152, at 30–39 (discussing how during “the negotiations for geographi- R
cal indications, however, the European wine sector strived to achieve additional protection be-
yond the general standards that were already established, while the North American countries
were interested in limiting intellectual property rights rather than extending them.”); see also
Zahn, supra note 12, at 482 n.35. R
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In aligning the wines to be closer to the language of TRIPS, the
United States could be taking its first step in appeasing this tension.
Additionally, if some wines get categorized into the non-generic cate-
gory, then the grant of greater protection accepts one of the things the
European Union has been asking of the United States.154 While this
reinterpreted definition is not precisely the means that the European
Union seeks (in contrast to a bilateral agreement), it certainly does
more than what the United States does now.155
Furthermore, when Australia entered an agreement to increase its
protection of European wines, the European Union in return agreed
to recognize stronger protection for Australian products traded in the
European market.156 The agreement also stimulated the volume of
wine traded between the two markets.157 The increased volume has
been attributed to the “easier access” Australia was given to the Euro-
pean market.158 While moving wines from semi-generic to non-generic
is a smaller step than entering a bilateral agreement, the European
Union would be more apt to negotiate greater protection to the North
American wines sold in Europe, as well as lower the difficulty it would
take to enter European markets.159 This outcome may justify the argu-
ment disfavoring stronger protection, alleging it would serve as a bar-
rier preventing our wineries from fairly referencing geographical
locations when describing their wines.160
C. Other Practical Impacts
The actions that harm wine names can also be described as dilutive.
Where infringement addresses consumer confusion and deception, di-
lution establishes a cause of action for uses of a famous mark that
lessen its distinguishing power or interfere with its uniqueness.161 As
defined by the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA), dilution is
154. See Zahn, supra note 12, at 483; CAROL ROBERTSON, THE LITTLE RED BOOK OF WINE R
LAW: A CASE OF LEGAL ISSUES 151 (2008) (“The EU finds terms such as ‘California Cham-
pagne’ to be deceptive and confusing to consumers as well as harmful to the image and value of
wines produced in regions that rightfully claim the name of that particular place.”). For a further
discussion of the tension between the EU and United States, see Hughes, supra note 2, at R
301–02.
155. Zylberg, supra note 152, at 30–39; see also Zahn, supra note 12, at 482 n.35. R
156. See generally Zahn, supra note 12. R
157. Id. at 493–94.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 496–97 (discussing how the current regulations serve as a barrier by preventing
producers from using certain terms to describe their wines). See also generally Glynn S. Lunney,
Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999).
161. Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86
TEX. L. REV. 507, 517–18 (2008) (“Even without confusion between Buick cars and Buick aspi-
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the “lessening of . . . a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods
or services, regardless of the presence or absence of competition be-
tween the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or likelihood
of confusion, mistake, or deception.”162 So unlike trademark infringe-
ment, where the consumer is deceived or confused about whether the
manufacturer of one product also manufactured the infringing prod-
uct,163 issues of dilution revolve around a premise that it is clear to the
consumer that there are different manufacturers involved.164 Courts
have found that dilution causes various harms to the owner of a
mark.165 The most recognized injuries that define dilution involve
blurring and tarnishing.
“Blurring” is the idea that other brands are conjured when the con-
sumer hears the name of the mark.166 As the Seventh Circuit illus-
trated in Ty Inc. v. Perryman, imagine a high-end restaurant named
“Tiffany’s.”167 If you ask a consumer if they want to go to Tiffany’s,
the response may now be “the jewelry store or the restaurant?”168 On
the other hand, “tarnishment” occurs when a mark is weakened
through unflattering associations.169 Posner elaborated on this idea by
discussing the potential for a strip club to be named Tiffany’s.170 No-
body would assume that the jewelry store was associated with the strip
club, but nevertheless, the consumer’s “image of the fancy jewelry
store will be tarnished by the association of the word with the strip
joint” because consumers process different marks by association.171
To further explore the practical harm of dilution, researchers con-
ducted an empirical study to measure the cognitive reactions involved
when participants were asked to identify the Heineken beer brand
rin, the existence of the latter would make the former less able to sell cars. Many states accepted
this theory in subsequent decades and enacted laws providing for relief against dilution.”).
162. Federal Trademark Dilution Act, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985, 986 (1996) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125, 1127 (2012)).
163. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012). The likelihood that a consumer will be confused is often treated
as the standard for infringement.
164. Id. § 1127. Dilution is the “lessening . . . of a famous mark to identify and distinguish
goods or services, regardless of . . . likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.” Id. (emphasis
added).
165. Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2002).
166. Id. at 511.
167. Id.
168. “Consumers will have to think harder—incur as it were a higher imagination cost—to
recognize the name as the name of the store.” Id. at 511.
169. See Tushnet, supra note 161, at 522 (citing Perryman, 306 F.3d at 511). R
170. When those aware of a Tiffany’s Strip Club “think of the word ‘Tiffany’ their image of
the fancy jewelry store will be tarnished by the association of the word with the strip joint.”
Perryman, 306 F.3d at 511.
171. Id.
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under varying circumstances.172 In that study, a test group was shown
diluting ads (“Heineken popcorn”), while the control group only saw
ads that used Heineken to identify Heineken beer.173 When asked to
identify Heineken as a brand for beer, those exposed to diluting ad-
vertisements took, on average, 770 milliseconds to do so.174 Mean-
while, those who were not exposed to diluting advertisements took, on
average, 645 milliseconds to do so.175
The existence of the semi-generic category exacerbates this damage
by allowing use of caveats to excuse wine producers’ use of a regional
designation to name their wines that come from other regions.176 One
could view the semi-generic category as a sanctioned allowance of di-
lution, since it allows the use of the name if it clarifies that it comes
from a different region, thus contributing to any dilutive harms the
wines face.177 It is also unclear what should happen when the owner of
a trademark established prior to the enactment of the wine regulation
would face a statutory hurdle if they had a valid claim for dilution.
Removal of the semi-generic category would help avoid this uncer-
tainty because the wines would have to be divided into either the ge-
neric or non-generic categories. The division would likely decide that
either the wine is generic and would not be protected from dilution, or
the wine is non-generic and a dilution claim is valid.
Commentators have treated dilution as a means of addressing mar-
ket failures drawing from trademark law, in that it prevents competi-
tors from free-riding off the goodwill of another trademark just
because it is done in a non-confusing manner.178 Though the debate
about whether trademarks are a public or private good has a long and
storied past, they arguably create externalities similar to a public
good.179 Contextualized here, using the wine designation comes with
various notions about the character of the product.180 The externality
here is the social benefit of evoking a certain image of wine that free-
riders gain when using a term like “champagne” regardless of whether
the wine originates from Champagne, France. Moreover, markets
have been seen as inefficient when entities fail to intervene and ac-
172. Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution: Empirical Measures for an Elu-
sive Concept, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 265, 268–69 (2000). For a further discussion on the
findings of this study, see Tushnet, supra note 161, at 521. R
173. Morrin & Jacoby, supra note 172, at 268–69. R
174. Id. at 279.
175. Id.
176. See Ritzert, supra note 11, at 219–20. R
177. Id.
178. Id. at 216.
179. Id. at 219–20.
180. Id. at 219.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\68-4\DPL403.txt unknown Seq: 23 12-JUN-19 8:50
2019] WINE NOT? 775
count for the externalities of a certain good.181 As discussed above,
the regulation on semi-generic wines blur the boundaries of a wine
producer’s rights over a regulated term. Without granting the semi-
generic wines clearer protection limiting the externalities of free rid-
ing, the semi-generic category fails to internalize externalities.182 Thus,
minimizing the regulation’s dilutive effects on semi-generic wine
marks will also help improve market inefficiencies since it would help
internalize externalities.183
V. CONCLUSION
By protecting geographical indications under trademark law, the
United States is attempting to fit a square peg in a round hole. Exac-
erbating this incongruence, the United States has created a regulation
for wines that is neither consistent with trademark law, nor with the
international treaties governing their protection. By considering how
collective marks indicating geographical origin are not inherently
weak, the United States can address the disparities in its wine regula-
tions. Specifically, by removing the semi-generic wine category, its
regulations can be closer aligned with both TRIPS and trademark law.
This change could not only further uniformity, but it could also rem-
edy the dissension between American and European agreements in
regards to intellectual property. And while there may be many differ-
ences in how to approach these geographical indications, one thing
remains true—everyone around the table enjoys a glass of wine.
Cheers.
Aris D. Suarez
181. Id. at 214–15.
182. See Ritzert, supra note 11, at 216–17. R
183. Id.
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